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Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East 
WILL KYMLICKA 
Professor of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Canada, and Visiting Professor in the 
Nationalism Studies Program, Central European University, Budapest 
 
Are Western models of multiculturalism and minority rights relevant for the post-Communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe? This article describes a range of Western models, and 
explores the social and political conditions that have led to their adoption in the West. It then 
considers various factors which might make the adoption of these models difficult in Eastern 
Europe, and considers the potential role of the international community in overcoming these 
obstacles. 
 
Introduction 
 
Countries in post-communist Europe have been pressured to adopt Western standards or models 
of multiculturalism and minority rights. Indeed, respect for minority rights is one of the 
accession criteria that candidate countries must meet to enter the European Union (EU) and 
NATO. Candidate countries are evaluated and ranked in terms of how well they are living up to 
these standards (see EU Accession Monitoring Program OSI 2001). 
There are two interlinked processes at work here. First, we see the ‘internationalizing’ of 
minority rights issues. How states treat their minorities is now seen as a matter of legitimate 
international concern, monitoring and intervention. Second, this international framework is 
deployed to export Western models to newly-democratizing countries in Eastern Europe. 
This trend implicitly rests on four premises: (i) that there are certain common standards or 
models in the Western democracies; (ii) that they are working well in the West; (iii) that they 
are applicable to Eastern and Central Europe (hereafter ECE), and would work well there if 
adopted; (iv) that there is a legitimate role for the international community to play in promoting 
or imposing these standards.  
All four of these assumptions are controversial. Western countries differ amongst themselves 
in their approach to ethnic relations, and attempts to codify a common set of minimum 
standards or best practices have proven difficult. Moreover, the success of these approaches is 
often deeply contested within Western countries. Many citizens of Western democracies view 
their domestic policies towards ethnic relations as ineffective, if not actually harmful. The 
wisdom of ‘exporting’ these policies to ECE countries is even more controversial, both in the 
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West and the East. Countries in post-Communist Europe differ significantly from Western 
countries (and from each other) in terms of history, demography, geopolitical stability, 
economic development and democratic consolidation. Given these differences, Western 
approaches may simply not be relevant or helpful, and attempts to impose them against the 
wishes or traditions of the local population can be counter-productive in terms of ethnic 
relations.  
So the decision to make minority rights one of the criteria for ‘rejoining Europe’ rests on a 
number of controversial assumptions. This decision was taken by Western leaders in the early 
1990s, almost in panic, as a response to fears that ethnic conflict would spiral out of control 
across the post-Communist world. There was relatively little public debate or scholarly analysis 
about the wisdom of this decision, and it seems clear in retrospect that it was taken without a 
full consideration of its implications, or of the difficulties it raised. 
In my view, the time has come to have a vigorous and public debate about these four 
assumptions. Now that the initial panic about ethnic violence has subsided, and with relative 
peace throughout the region, we can afford to sit back and think more carefully about the 
potential and pitfalls of ‘exporting’ and ‘internationalizing’ minority rights. 
 
In a recent volume (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001), I attempted to explore these four basic 
assumptions in some depth. In this short article, I can only give a brief sketch of my 
conclusions.  
 
I. Western Trends Regarding Ethnocultural Diversity 
 
First, then, what do we mean by Western standards or models of multiculturalism and minority 
rights? Efforts have been made by various international organizations to formally codify a set of 
minority rights or multicultural practices, including the 1992 Declaration of the United Nations, 
the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Charter and the 1995 
Framework Convention of the Council of Europe, and various Recommendations of the 
OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities (1996, 1998, 1999). In theory, these 
embody the standards that ECE countries are expected to meet. 
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These documents are important, but are potentially misleading as a guide to Western 
understandings of minority rights (and hence to Western expectations about how ECE countries 
should behave). For one thing, these declarations are often quite vague. They typically assert 
broad principles of respect and recognition for minority groups, but then hedge them with 
multiple qualifiers about ‘where appropriate’ and ‘within the framework of national law’. Also, 
these formal declarations are continually evolving, most recently in efforts to include minority 
rights in proposals for a new Constitution of the European Union.  
In my view, these formal declarations are the surface manifestation of deeper trends that are 
occurring throughout the Western democracies regarding ethnic relations. In order to fully 
understand the forces at work in current processes of internationalizing and exporting minority 
rights, we need to look below these formal documents to the underlying social trends. 
 
There have in fact been dramatic changes in the way Western democracies deal with 
ethnocultural diversity in the last thirty to forty years. In the volume, I highlight five such trends, 
but for the purposes of this paper let me focus on two. 
The first concerns the treatment of substate/minority nationalisms, such as the Québécois in 
Canada, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in 
Belgium, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy, and Puerto Rico in the United 
States.1 In all of these cases, we find a regionally-concentrated group that conceives of itself has 
a nation within a larger state, and mobilizes behind nationalist political parties to achieve 
recognition of its nationhood, either in the form of an independent state or through territorial 
autonomy within the larger state. In the past, all of these countries have attempted to suppress 
these forms of substate nationalism. To have a regional group with a sense of distinct 
nationhood was seen as a threat to the state. Various efforts were made to erode this sense of 
distinct nationhood, including restricting minority language rights, abolishing traditional forms 
of regional self-government, and encouraging members of the dominant group to settle in the 
minority group’s traditional territory so that the minority becomes outnumbered even in its 
traditional territory.  
                     
1. We could also include the French and Italian minorities in Switzerland, although some people dispute whether 
they manifest a ‘national’ consciousness. 
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However, there has been a dramatic reversal in the way Western countries deal with substate 
nationalisms. Today, all of the countries I have just mentioned have accepted the principle that 
these substate national identities will endure into the indefinite future, and that their sense of 
nationhood and nationalist aspirations must be accommodated in some way or other. This 
accommodation has typically taken the form of what we can call ‘multination federalism’: that 
is, creating a federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local majority, 
and so can exercise meaningful forms of self-government. Moreover, the group’s language is 
typically recognized as an official state language, at least within their federal subunit, and 
perhaps throughout the country as a whole.  
At the beginning of the twentieth-century, only Switzerland and Canada had adopted this 
combination of territorial autonomy and official language status for substate national groups. 
Since then, however, virtually all Western democracies that contain sizeable substate nationalist 
movements have moved in this direction. The list includes the adoption of autonomy for the 
Swedish-speaking Åland Islands in Finland after the First World War, autonomy for South 
Tyrol and Puerto Rico after the Second World War, federal autonomy for Catalonia and the 
Basque Country in Spain in the 1970s, for Flanders in the 1980s, and most recently for Scotland 
and Wales in the 1990s. 
This, then, is the first major trend: a shift from suppressing substate nationalisms to 
accommodating them through regional autonomy and official language rights. Amongst the 
Western democracies with a sizeable national minority, only France is an exception to this 
trend, in its refusal to grant autonomy to its main substate nationalist group in Corsica. 
However, legislation was recently adopted to accord autonomy to Corsica, and it was only a 
ruling of the Constitutional Court that prevented its implementation. So France too, I think, will 
soon join the bandwagon. 
The second trend concerns the treatment of indigenous peoples, such as the Indians and Inuit 
in Canada, the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, the Sami of 
Scandinavia, the Inuit of Greenland, and Indian tribes in the United States. In the past, all of 
these countries had the same goal and expectation that indigenous peoples would eventually 
disappear as distinct communities, as a result of dying out, or intermarriage, or assimilation. 
Various policies were adopted to speed up this process, such as stripping indigenous peoples of 
their lands, restricting the practice of their traditional culture, language and religion, and 
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undermining their institutions of self-government.  
However, there has been a dramatic reversal in these policies, starting in the early 1970s. 
Today, all of the countries I just mentioned accept, at least in principle, the idea that indigenous 
peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct societies within the larger country, and 
that they must have the land claims, cultural rights (including recognition of customary law) and 
self-government rights needed to sustain themselves as distinct societies.  
We see this pattern in all of the Western democracies. Consider the constitutional affirmation 
of Aboriginal rights in the 1982 Canadian constitution, along with the land claims commission 
and the signing of new treaties; the revival of treaty rights through the Treaty of Waitangi in 
New Zealand; the recognition of land rights for Aboriginal Australians in the Mabo decision; 
the creation of the Sami Parliament in Scandinavia, the evolution of ‘Home Rule’ for the Inuit 
of Greenland; and the laws and court cases upholding self-determination rights for American 
Indian tribes (not to mention the flood of legal and constitutional changes recognizing 
indigenous rights in Latin America). In all of these countries there is a gradual but real process 
of decolonization taking place, as indigenous peoples regain their lands, customary law and self-
government. This is the second main shift in ethnocultural relations throughout the Western 
democracies. 
In the volume, I also discuss important shifts regarding other types of groups, including 
immigrants, guest-workers, refugees and African-Americans. In all of these contexts as well, we 
see shifts away from historic policies of assimilation or exclusion towards a more 
‘multicultural’ approach that recognizes and accommodates diversity. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, the cases of national minorities and indigenous 
peoples are particularly relevant. They help illustrate the extent to which Western democracies 
have moved away from older models of unitary, centralized nation-states, and repudiated older 
ideologies of ‘one state, one nation, one language’. Today, virtually all Western states that 
contain indigenous peoples and substate national groups have become ‘multination’ states, 
recognizing the existence of ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’ within the boundaries of the state. This 
recognition is manifested in a range of minority rights that includes regional autonomy and 
official language status for national minorities, and customary law, land claims, and self-
government for indigenous peoples. 
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These, then, are some of the deep trends that are shaping domestic practices and opinions in 
the Western democracies. The extent to which these two trends have been ‘internationalized’ 
differs. In the case of indigenous peoples, serious efforts have been made to codify these 
emerging practices at the level of international law. Land claims, customary law and self-
government for indigenous peoples are all clearly affirmed in recent international documents, 
such as the draft declarations at the United Nations and the Organization of American States. In 
this case, emerging international law reflects the most advanced practices of Western countries 
in terms of accommodating indigenous peoples. 
By contrast, only very modest minority rights, such as mother-tongue primary education, 
have been recognized in the case of substate national groups. No international document has 
affirmed any principle of territorial autonomy or official language status for substate national 
groups.2 In this case, international law lags far behind the emerging practices of Western 
democracies in terms of the rights accorded to substate national groups. To oversimplify, we 
might say that while international law is attempting to codify ‘best practices’ in the case of 
indigenous peoples, it is only codifying the most ‘minimal standards’ or ‘lowest common 
denominator’ in the case of substate national groups. 
These variations in the formal content of international documents are important, but they 
should not blind us to the underlying trends. An increasing number of citizens in the West have 
grown accustomed to the idea of living in a ‘multination’ state that accords substate nations and 
indigenous peoples the rights and powers needed to sustain themselves as distinct and self-
governing societies into the indefinite future. Substate national groups do not have a right to 
multination federalism under international law, but many people in the West view this as the 
‘best’ response to substate nationalisms. It is in any event viewed as a fully legitimate option. It 
is seen as natural and acceptable for substate groups to desire this sort of arrangement, and 
normal and appropriate for a free and democratic state to move in this direction.  
 
                     
2. This idea was floated in Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in 1993, 
but was quickly dropped in subsequent European declarations, not least due to the vehement opposition of France 
and Greece.  
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II. Explaining and Evaluating the Western Models 
 
So we see emerging trends in the West towards various forms of multiculturalism and minority 
rights. This raises two important questions. First, why have so many Western countries moved 
in this direction? And second, how should we evaluate this trend? Should we view these models 
as a ‘success’ or a ‘best practice’ to be celebrated, and perhaps even to be exported to other 
regions, such as the ECE? 
Let me start with the first question. In my view, there are three central factors that have made 
these trends possible, and perhaps even inevitable in the Western democracies: 
 
(a) Demographics: The first factor is simply demographics. In the past, many governments had 
the hope or expectation that ethnic minorities would simply disappear, through dying out or 
assimilation or intermarriage. It is now clear that this is not going to happen. Indigenous peoples 
are the fastest-growing segment of the population in the countries where they are found, with 
very high birth rates. The percentage of immigrants in the population is growing steadily in most 
Western countries, and most commentators agree that even more immigrants will be needed in 
the future to offset declining birth rates and an ageing population. And substate national groups 
in the West are also growing in absolute numbers, even if they are staying the same or 
marginally declining as a percentage of the population. No one anymore can have the dream or 
delusion that minorities will disappear. The numbers count, particularly in a democracy, and the 
numbers are shifting in the direction of non-dominant groups. 
 
(b) Rights-Consciousness: The second factor is the human rights revolution, and the resulting 
development of a ‘rights consciousness’. Since 1948, we have an international order that is 
premised on the idea of the inherent equality of human beings, both as individuals and as 
peoples. The international order has decisively repudiated older ideas of a racial or ethnic 
hierarchy, according to which some peoples were superior to others, and thereby had the right to 
rule over them.  
It is important to remember how radical these ideas of human equality are. Assumptions 
about a hierarchy of peoples were widely accepted throughout the West up until World War II, 
when Hitler’s fanatical and murderous policies discredited them. Indeed, the whole system of 
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European colonialism was premised on the assumption of a hierarchy of peoples, and was the 
explicit basis of both domestic policies and international law throughout the nineteenth century 
and first half of the twentieth century. 
Today, however, we live in a world where the idea of human equality is unquestioned, at 
least officially. What matters here is not the change in international law per se, which has little 
impact on most people’s everyday lives. The real change has been in people’s consciousness. 
Members of historically subordinated groups today demand equality, and demand it as a right. 
They believe they are entitled to equality, and entitled to it now, not in some indefinite or 
millenarian future.  
This sort of rights-consciousness has become such a pervasive feature of modernity that we 
have trouble imagining that it did not always exist. But if we examine the historical records, we 
find that minorities in the past typically justified their claims, not by appeal to human rights or 
equality, but by appealing to the generosity of rulers in according ‘privileges’, often in return for 
past loyalty and services. Today, by contrast, groups have a powerful sense of entitlement to 
equality as a basic human right, not as a favour or charity, and are angrily impatient with what 
they perceive as lingering manifestations of older hierarchies. 
Of course, there is no consensus on what ‘equality’ means (and, conversely, no agreement on 
what sorts of actions or practices are evidence of ‘hierarchy’). People who agree on the general 
principle of the equality of peoples may disagree about whether or when this requires official 
bilingualism, for example, or consociational power sharing. But there can be no doubt that 
Western democracies historically privileged a particular national group over other groups who 
were subject to assimilation or exclusion. This historic hierarchy was reflected in a wide range 
of policies and institutions, from the schools and state symbols to policies regarding language, 
immigration, media, citizenship, the division of powers, and electoral systems. So long as 
minority nationalist leaders can identify (or conjure up) manifestations of these historic 
hierarchies, they will be able to draw upon the powerful rights-consciousness of their members. 
 
(c) Democracy: The third key factor, I believe, is democracy. Put simply, the consolidation of 
democracy limits the ability of elites to crush dissenting movements. In many countries around 
the world, elites ban political movements of minority groups, or pay thugs or paramilitaries to 
beat up or kill minority leaders, or bribe police and judges to lock them up. The fear of this sort 
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of repression often keeps minority groups from voicing even the most moderate claims. 
Keeping quiet is the safest option for minorities in many countries. 
In consolidated democracies, however, where democracy is the only game in town, there is 
no option but to allow minority groups to mobilize politically and advance their claims in 
public. As a result, members of minority groups are increasingly unafraid to speak out. They 
may not win the political debate, but they are not afraid of being killed, jailed or fired for trying. 
It is this loss of fear, combined with rights-consciousness, that explains the remarkably vocal 
nature of ethnic politics in contemporary Western democracies. 
Moreover, democracy involves the availability of multiple access points to decision-making. 
If a group is blocked at one level by an unsympathetic government, they can pursue their claims 
at another level. Even if an unsympathetic right-wing political party were to win power at the 
central level, and attempted to cut back on the rights of minorities, these groups could shift their 
focus to the regional level, or to the municipal level. And even if all of these levels are blocked, 
they could pursue their claims through the courts, or even through international pressure. This is 
what democracy is all about: multiple and shifting points of access to power. 
 
Where these three conditions are in place – increasing numbers, increasing rights-
consciousness, and multiple points of access for safe political mobilization – I believe that the 
trend towards greater accommodation of ethnic diversity is likely to arise. Indeed, I think it is 
virtually inevitable. This is the lesson I draw from the experience of all the Western 
democracies. These trends have not depended on the presence or absence of particular 
personalities, or particular political parties, or particular electoral systems. We see enormous 
variation across the Western democracies in terms of leadership personalities, party platforms 
and electoral systems. Yet the basic trends regarding ethnic diversity are the same. And the 
explanation, I believe, rests in these three deep sociological facts about numbers, rights-
consciousness, and opportunity-structures. 
There may of course be disruptions in this general trend. Economic crises or considerations 
of state security can quickly override debates on minority rights. September 11th, for example, 
has reconfigured debates about the accommodation of Arab and Muslim immigrants in many 
Western countries. (I will return to the relationship between minority rights and state security 
later, since it is particularly important in the ECE context.) But in the West, such economic or 
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geopolitical crises have been relatively rare, and led only to temporary deviations in the 
underlying trend towards accommodation. 
So there are a variety of sociological factors that underlie the trend towards multiculturalism 
and minority rights in the West. But how should we evaluate this trend? Should it be judged a 
‘success’? Are the emerging Western models of immigrant multiculturalism, indigenous self-
government and multination federalism something to celebrate, and perhaps to export? 
Let me focus on the evaluation of multination federations, since they are probably the most 
relevant and also the most controversial for ECE countries. Are multination federations in the 
West working well? In some cases, it is simply too early to tell to judge their success. For 
example, the federalization of Spain and Belgium is comparatively recent, and devolution in the 
United Kingdom is only a few years old.  
However, if we look across the broad range of cases, I think we can make some fairly firm 
judgements about their strengths and weaknesses. Multination federalism in the West has 
clearly been ‘successful’ along some dimensions, and equally clearly been a ‘failure’ along other 
dimensions.  
 
Let’s start with the successes. I would argue that multination federalism has been successful 
along at least five dimensions:  
 
(i) peace and individual security – these multination federations are managing to deal 
with their competing national identities and nationalist projects with an almost complete 
absence of violence or terrorism by either the state or the minority.3 
 
(ii) democracy – ethnic politics is now a matter of ‘ballots not bullets’, operating under 
normal democratic procedures, with no threat of military coups or authoritarian regimes 
which take power in the name of national security. 
 
(iii) individual rights – these reforms have been achieved within the framework of 
liberal constitutions, with firm respect for individual civil and political rights. 
                     
3. The Basque Country is the main exception, although of course the ETA campaign of violence began in the 1960s 
and 1970s as a response to the highly-centralized Fascist regime, and is unlikely to have emerged had Spain been a 
democratic multination federation. 
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(iv) economic prosperity – the move to multination federalism has also been achieved 
without jeopardizing the economic well-being of citizens. Indeed, the countries that have 
adopted multination federalism are amongst the wealthiest in the world. 
 
(v) inter-group equality – last but not least, multination federalism has promoted 
equality between majority and minority groups. By equality here I mean non-
domination, such that one group is not systematically vulnerable to the domination of 
another group. Multination federalism has helped create greater economic equality 
between majority and minority; greater equality of political influence, so that minorities 
are not continually outvoted on all issues; and greater equality in the social and cultural 
fields, as reflected for example in reduced levels of prejudice and discrimination 
between groups. 
 
On all these criteria, multination federalism in the West must surely be judged as a success. 
These multination federations have not only managed the conflicts arising from their competing 
national identities in a peaceful and democratic way, but have also secured a high degree of 
economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizens. This is truly remarkable when 
one considers the immense power of nationalism in the past hundred years. Nationalism has 
torn apart colonial empires and Communist dictatorships, and redefined boundaries all over the 
world. Yet democratic multination federations have succeeded in taming the force of 
nationalism. Democratic federalism has domesticated and pacified nationalism, while respecting 
individual rights and freedoms. It is difficult to imagine any other political system that can make 
the same claim. 
However, there are two important respects in which multination federations have not 
succeeded. First, the lived experience of inter-group relations is hardly a model of robust or 
constructive intercultural exchange. At best, most citizens in the dominant group are ignorant 
of, and indifferent to, the internal life of minority groups, and vice versa. At worst, the relations 
between different groups are tinged with feelings of resentment and annoyance. Despite the 
significant reforms of state institutions in the direction of multination federalism, substate 
national groups still typically feel that the older ideology of the homogenous nation-state has not 
been fully renounced, and that members of the dominant group have not fully accepted the 
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principle of a multination state (or have not fully accepted all of its implications). By contrast, 
the members of the dominant group typically feel that members of minority groups are 
ungrateful for the changes that have been made, unreasonable in their expectations, and are 
impossible to satisfy. As a result, inter-group relations are often highly politicized, as members 
of both sides are (over?)-sensitive to perceived slights, indignities and misunderstandings. As a 
result, many people avoid inter-group contact, where possible, or at least do not go out of their 
way to increase their contact with members of the other group. When contact does take place, it 
tends to reduce quickly to rather crude forms of bargaining and negotiation, rather than any 
deeper level of cultural sharing or common deliberation.  
The result is sometimes described as the phenomenon of ‘parallel societies’, or even of ‘two 
solitudes’. Consider the Flemish in Belgium or Québécois in Canada. Multination federalism 
has enabled these national groups to live more completely within their own institutions 
operating in their own language. In the past, these groups often faced extensive economic, 
political and social pressure to participate in institutions run in the dominant language. For 
example, all of the courts, or universities, or legislatures, were only conducted in the majority 
language. Yet today, as a result of adopting the ideal of a multination federation, these groups 
have been able to build up an extensive array of public institutions in their own language, so that 
they can access the full range of educational, economic, legal and political opportunities without 
having to learn the dominant language, or without having to participate in institutions that are 
primarily run by members of the dominant group. In effect, these sorts of multination 
federations allow groups to create ‘parallel societies’, co-existing alongside the dominant 
society, without necessarily much interaction between them.  
The interactions between these parallel societies can be very minimal indeed. The French-
speaking and English-speaking societies in Canada have often been described as ‘two solitudes’, 
which I believe is an accurate description. Francophones and Anglophones in Canada read 
different newspapers, listen to different radio programs, watch different TV shows, read 
different literatures. Moreover, they are generally quite uninterested in each other’s culture. Few 
English-speaking Canadians have any desire to learn about internal cultural developments 
within French-speaking Canada, and vice versa. Anglophones are not interested in reading 
francophone authors (even in translation), or in learning about who are the hot new media stars 
or public intellectuals or entertainers within Quebec (and vice-versa). 
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This sort of parallel societies/two solitudes also exists in Belgium between the Flemish- and 
French-speaking groups. And also in Switzerland between the German, French and Italian-
speaking groups. Switzerland has been described as composed of three groups that “stand with 
their backs to each other” (Steiner 2001: 145). The French-Swiss stand facing towards France; 
the Italian-Swiss facing towards Italy; and the German-Swiss facing towards Germany, each 
focused on their own internal cultural life and the media and culture of the neighbouring country 
whose language they share. Most members of all three groups accept the principle that 
Switzerland must be a multilingual state that recognizes and shares power amongst its 
constituent groups. But few people have much interest in learning about or interacting with the 
other groups. 
In short, increased fairness at the level of state institutions has not been matched by 
improvements at the level of the lived experience of inter-group relations. The state has made 
itself accessible to all citizens, and affirms the important contribution that each group makes to 
the larger society. But from the point of view of individuals, the presence of other groups is 
rarely experienced as enriching. On the contrary, the level of mutual indifference in these 
countries (and hence the reduction of interethnic relations to mere bargaining) has been 
described as “nauseous” by one critic of multiculturalism (Barry 2001: 312). The state has 
become more just, inclusive and accommodating, but inter-group relations remain divided and 
strained. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, multination federations have not removed secession 
from the political agenda. On the contrary secessionist ideas and secessionist mobilization is 
part of everyday life in many Western multination federations. Secessionist parties compete for 
political office, and electors may even be given the choice of voting for secession in a 
referendum (as in Puerto Rico and Quebec). To date, no such referendum on secession has 
succeeded in the West. This suggests that the adoption of federalism has reduced the actual 
likelihood of secession, since it is almost certain that one or more of these countries would have 
broken up long ago without federalism. Had Canada, Belgium and Spain not been able to 
federalize, they might not exist as countries today. 
But even if federalism reduces the likelihood of secession, it does not remove secession from 
the political agenda. Secessionists are on TV, in newspapers, and compete freely for elected 
office. And secessionist political parties often get substantial support in elections: e.g. 40 per 
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cent in Quebec; 30 per cent in Scotland; 15 per cent in Belgium or the Basque country; 10 per 
cent in Catalonia; 5 per cent in Puerto Rico. This means that secessionists are present in 
parliament and on government commissions, and they use these platforms to articulate their 
views. So, while multination federalism may have reduced the actual likelihood of secession, it 
has not removed it from everyday political life, or taken it off the political agenda. It has not 
‘solved the problem of secession’. 
So we have a mixed balance sheet, with both successes and failures. What then should be our 
overall judgement? In some eyes, the failures outweigh the successes. For some people – let’s 
call them ‘statists’ – the key issue is secession. They believe that eliminating any threat of 
secession is the first and foremost criterion for evaluating state institutions. The first task of any 
state is to ensure the integrity of its borders, and so states must first remove secession from the 
political agenda, and only then think about how best to improve individual rights or democracy 
or equality. Viewed from a statist perspective, multination federalism fails. 
For other people – let’s call them ‘communitarians’ – the key issue is interpersonal relations 
between citizens. They believe that a political community should be precisely a community, 
united by strong feelings of fraternity and common identity. Viewed from this communitarian 
perspective, multination federalism abandons the goal of a united community. It accepts the 
existence of more or less permanent divisions within the polity, and indeed institutionalizes 
these divisions within state structures. Unwilling to accept this sort of division, communitarians 
reject multination federalism.  
Many citizens in the West, however, have concluded that the successes of multination 
federalism outweigh the failures. From their point of view – let’s call it the ‘liberal-democratic’ 
perspective – the fundamental criterion is neither the sanctity of state boundaries nor the 
strength of community feelings. Rather, political institutions should be judged by their impact 
on the lives of individuals, as measured by the basic liberal criteria of personal freedom and 
security, democratic rights, and economic security and prosperity. And on these criteria, 
multination federalism in the West does quite well. It enables citizens in both majority and 
minority groups to live freely and peacefully, to participate actively in government, and to enjoy 
comparatively high levels of economic security and prosperity.  
From this liberal-democratic point of view, it may be a source of disappointment that the 
members of different groups stand with their back to each other. But they stand as free and 
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equal citizens, leading lives of peace and prosperity, under a state that upholds their rights and 
operates even-handedly between the different groups. And that surely is the main task of a 
liberal-democratic state. It may also be a source of frustration that state boundaries are contested 
by secessionists. But so long as the secessionist mobilization occurs in a peaceful and 
democratic way, with respect for liberal rights and freedoms, then it must be tolerated. The only 
way to eliminate secessionist mobilization and communal divisions would be to eliminate 
substate nationalisms, and that in turn could only be achieved by restricting individual rights and 
democratic freedoms. As I have just noted, there are powerful sociological forces that underlie 
ethnic mobilization, and wherever the members of substate national groups and indigenous 
peoples are given the individual freedom and democratic space to mobilize against (what they 
perceive as) inherited hierarchies, they are likely to do so. And so the choice is between finding 
liberal-democratic means of institutionalizing that ethnic mobilization, or of adopting illiberal 
and undemocratic means of suppressing it. For liberal-democrats, the choice is obvious.  
In any event, it is far from clear that attempts to suppress minority nationalism would 
actually work. They are likely to drive nationalist mobilization underground, and perhaps even 
into violent resistance. While statists and communitarians might be willing in principle to adopt 
illiberal or undemocratic means to suppress substate nationalism, they increasingly recognize 
that such efforts are likely to be futile, given the growing numbers and powerful rights-
consciousness of the members of minority groups. Statists and communitarians in the West are, 
slowly and grudgingly, giving up on the dream that they can create political communities 
unblemished by secessionist sentiments or communal divisions.  
In short, we see a growing consensus on the appropriateness of multination federalism in 
the West, but this support is hedged with ambivalence and reservations. Members of the 
majority group are disappointed and resentful that moving to multination federalism has not 
succeeded in eliminating secessionist mobilization and communal divisions. Members of the 
minority group typically feel that aspects of the old hierarchies remain in the habits and 
practices of the dominant group and in the institutions of the state, and resent the fact that the 
dominant group has not fully embraced the spirit of partnership. These feelings of resentment 
and misunderstanding wax and wane, but they are always close enough to the surface to make 
all sides wonder whether the whole effort was worthwhile, or whether the country will stay 
together. 
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Under these circumstances, it is potentially misleading to describe multination federalism 
as a ‘success’, let alone as something to ‘celebrate’. Celebration is hardly the spirit with 
which most Western citizens view the institutions of multination federalism. And yet, beneath 
the reservations and ambivalence, there is also the sense that this is the best, and perhaps the 
only, way for liberal democracies to deal with substate nationalisms. 
 
III. Relevance to Eastern Central Europe 
 
Much more could be said about the strengths and weaknesses of multination federalism in the 
West, or about other forms of multiculturalism and minority rights. But let me turn now to 
ECE countries, and ask whether is feasible or desirable to ‘export’ these models to post-
Communist Europe.  
Both the practice and the discourse of minority rights in ECE is very different. There is 
enormous resistance in virtually every ECE country to the idea of federalism or other forms of 
territorial autonomy for national minorities. 
In some cases, pre-existing forms of minority autonomy were scrapped: Serbia revoked the 
autonomy of Kosovo/Vojvodina; Georgia revoked the autonomy of Abkhazia and Ossetia; 
Azerbaijan revoked the autonomy of Ngorno-Karabakh. Indeed, the revoking of minority 
autonomy was often one of the first things that these countries chose to do with their new-
found freedom after the collapse of communism. In other cases, requests to restore historic 
forms of autonomy were rejected (e.g. Romania refused to restore the autonomy to 
Transylvania which had been revoked in 1968). In yet other cases, requests to create new 
forms of autonomy were dismissed (e.g. Estonia rejected a referendum supporting autonomy 
for Russian-dominated Narva; Kazakhstan rejected autonomy for ethnic Russians in the 
north; Ukraine rejected a referendum supporting autonomy for ethnic Romanian areas; 
Lithuania rejected requests for autonomy by ethnic Poles; Macedonia rejected a referendum 
for autonomy for Albanian-dominated Western Macedonia in 1992). And in yet other cases, 
countries have redrawn boundaries to make it impossible for autonomy to be adopted in the 
future (e.g. Slovakia redrew its internal boundaries so that ethnic Hungarians would not form 
a majority within any of the internal administrative districts, and hence would have no 
platform to claim autonomy; Croatia redrew internal boundaries in Krajina and West Slavonia 
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to dilute Serbian-populated areas). 
The only cases in ECE where territorial autonomy has been accepted are cases where the 
national minority simply grabbed political power extra-constitutionally, and established de 
facto autonomy without the consent of the central government. In these situations, the only 
alternative to recognizing de facto autonomy was military intervention and potential civil war. 
This was the situation in TransDneister in Moldova; Abkhazia in Georgia; Krajina in Croatia; 
Crimea in Ukraine; and Ngorno-Karabakh in Armenia. Even here, most countries preferred 
civil war to negotiating autonomy, and only accepted autonomy if and when they were not 
able to win militarily. (Russia and Ukraine are the two exceptions.) 
We see a similar trend with respect to official language rights. Despite the striking levels 
of linguistic diversity in many ECE countries, Belarus is the only one that has adopted a 
policy of official bilingualism. Taras discusses the ‘paradox’ that formerly monolingual 
countries in the West are moving towards greater respect for linguistic diversity, whereas 
formerly multilingual countries of the Soviet Union are “pressing ahead with unilingualism” 
(Taras 1998: 79). 
In short, we see a dramatic difference between East and West in the basic approaches to 
substate nationalism and multination federalism. What explains this difference? In the 
volume, I explore a range of possible explanations that I can only briefly touch on here. Two 
common explanations can be quickly dismissed. Some people argue that whereas 
ethnonational groups in the West reside in homogenous territories, in the East they are 
dispersed and inter-mingled, and so territorial solutions that work in the West will not work 
in the East. I think this is simply incorrect as a generalization. The ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia, or ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, are no more or less territorially concentrated 
than the French in Canada, Puerto Ricans in the US or Catalans in Spain. In all of these cases, 
there is a region in which the substate national group is particularly concentrated, but there 
are both ‘internal minorities’ (i.e. people living in that region who do not belong to the 
substate national group) and a ‘minority diaspora’ (i.e. members of the substate national 
group who live outside the region). The size of these internal minorities and minority 
diasporas in many ECE countries is no more or less than in comparable Western countries. 
A second common explanation for opposition to bilingualism and federalism in ECE is 
that they cost a great deal of money, and while rich Western countries can afford these costs, 
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poorer countries in ECE cannot. But this too is misleading. Federal countries can be just as 
efficient as unitary states, and studies suggest that bilingualism has negligible effects on 
overall state budgets. In fact, forcing public institutions in regions dominated by a linguistic 
minority to shift to the majority language is often a costly and inefficient process.  
So what then is the real explanation for the resistance to multination federalism? Why 
have people in ECE countries come to such different conclusions about its relative potential 
and pitfalls than in the West? 
One possible explanation is that there are more statists and communitarians in the East 
than West, and fewer liberals. As a result, ideas about the sanctity of the state and the unity of 
the nation are more powerful in the region, and are invoked to pre-empt the democratic 
freedoms and spaces needed for multiculturalism and minority rights to emerge.  
But that is at best part of the story. For the fact is that both liberals and 
statist/communitarians in the ECE are more likely to oppose multination federalism than their 
counterparts in the West. Liberal-democrats in the West assume that substate national groups 
will exercise their territorial autonomy in accordance with the basic principles of liberal 
constitutionalism, so that devolving power from the central state to a self-governing region 
does not threaten the basic respect for individual rights and democratic freedoms. This indeed 
is what we see throughout the Western multination federations. In the ECE, by contrast, many 
liberal-democrats worry that such substate autonomies will become petty tyrannies that flout 
the rule of law, deny human rights, and oppress internal minorities. 
Statists and communitarians in the West have grudgingly come to accept that their dreams 
of constructing a united community within uncontested borders are simply unrealistic. 
Attempts to preserve the ideology of ‘one language, one nation, one state’ through the 
assimilation or exclusion of minority groups have proven futile. Minorities are too numerous, 
and too politically conscious of their rights, to simply disappear. In the ECE, by contrast, 
many statists and communitarians cling to the hope that minority nationalism will fade away. 
They believe that substate nationalism is really a transient by-product of some other problem 
that will disappear over time through the processes of modernization or democratic transition. 
Some people assume that minority nationalism will fade as the economy improves, or as 
democracy is consolidated, or as communications and media become globalized. On this 
view, if ECE states have the strength to hold out against minority demagogues and ethnic 
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entrepreneurs, then the problem will gradually solve itself. This, of course, is precisely the 
expectation that Westerners have gradually relinquished, since minority nationalisms have in 
fact strengthened rather than weakened as Western states have become more democratic, 
prosperous and globalized.  
In comparing East and West then, we see a curious set of contrasts. In the ECE, many 
intellectuals and politicians are deeply pessimistic about the prospect that substate national 
groups can exercise territorial autonomy in accordance with liberal-democratic norms, yet are 
surprisingly optimistic about the possibility that substate nationalism will simply disappear. 
By contrast, Western public opinion is optimistic about the capacity of substate national 
groups to govern within liberal-democratic constraints, but pessimistic about the likelihood 
that substate nationalism will disappear as a result of processes of modernization, 
democratization, development or globalization. 
These differing forms of optimism and pessimism account for some of the differences 
between the West and East. But there is one other very important factor. As I mentioned 
earlier, the trend towards greater accommodation of diversity can be blocked or deflected by 
considerations of security. Whether in the East or West, states will not accord greater powers 
or resources to groups that are perceived as disloyal, and therefore a threat to the security of 
the state. In particular, states will not accommodate groups which are seen as likely to 
collaborate with foreign enemies. Most Western democracies are fortunate that this is rarely 
an issue. For example, if Quebec gains increased powers, or even independence, no one in the 
rest of Canada worries that Quebec will start collaborating with Iraq or the Taliban or China 
to overthrow the Canadian state. Québécois nationalists may want to secede, but an 
independent Quebec would be an ally of Canada, not an enemy, and would cooperate together 
with Canada in NATO and other Western defence and security arrangements. So too with 
Catalonia: if Catalonia becomes more autonomous, or even independent, it will still be an 
ally, not an enemy of Spain. So too with Scotland vis-à-vis the rest of Britain, Flanders vis-à-
vis the rest of Belgium, or Puerto Rico vis-à-vis the rest of the United States. 
In most parts of the world, however, minority groups are often seen as a kind of ‘fifth 
column’, likely to be working for a neighbouring enemy. This is particularly a concern where 
the minority is related to a neighbouring state by ethnicity or religion, so that the 
neighbouring state claims the right to intervene to protect ‘its’ minority. 
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Under these conditions, we are likely to witness what political scientists call the 
‘securitization’ of ethnic relations (Wæver 1995). Relations between states and minorities are 
seen, not as a matter of normal democratic politics to be negotiated and debated, but as a 
matter of state security, in which the state has to limit the normal democratic process in order 
to protect the state. Under conditions of securitization, minority self-organization may be 
legally limited (e.g. minority political parties banned), minority leaders may be subject to 
secret police surveillance, the raising of particular sorts of demands may be illegal (e.g. laws 
against promoting secession), and so on. Even if minority demands can be voiced, they will 
be flatly rejected by the larger society and the state. After all, how can groups that are disloyal 
have any legitimate claims against the state? So securitization of ethnic relations erodes both 
the democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will 
be accepted. 
This, I think, is precisely the situation we find throughout most of the ECE. State-minority 
relations have been ‘securitized’. Dominant groups throughout the region feel they have been 
victimized by their minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies. We see this in the 
Czech Republic regarding the German minority; in Slovakia re the Hungarian minority; in the 
Baltics re the Russian minority; in Croatia re the Serbian minority; in Bulgaria re the Turkish 
minority, to name a few.  
In all of these cases, minorities are seen (rightly or wrongly) as allies or collaborators with 
external powers that have historically oppressed the majority group. Hungarians in Romania 
and Slovakia may be a relatively small minority (10-15 per cent of the population in each 
country), but Slovakians and Romanians perceive them as the allies of their former Habsburg 
oppressors, and indeed as the physical residue of that unjust imperialism. The Russians who 
settled in Estonia and Latvia after World War II are seen by the state, not as a weak and 
disenfranchised minority group, but as a tool of their former Soviet oppressors. The Muslim 
Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia, or the Muslim Turks in Bulgaria, are seen as a reminder 
of, and collaborator with, centuries of oppression under the Ottomans. 
This history of imperialism, collaboration and border changes have encouraged three inter-
related assumptions which are now widely accepted by ECE countries: (a) that minorities are 
disloyal, not just in the sense that they lack loyalty to the state (that is equally true of 
secessionists in Quebec or Scotland), but in the stronger sense that they collaborated with 
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former oppressors, and continue to collaborate with current enemies or potential enemies; 
therefore, (b) a strong and stable state requires weak and disempowered minorities. Put 
another way, ethnic relations are seen as a zero-sum game: anything that benefits the minority 
is seen as a threat to the majority; and therefore (c) the treatment of minorities is above all a 
question of national security. 
In the West, by contrast, ethnic politics have been almost entirely ‘desecuritized’. The 
politics of substate nationalism in the West is just that – normal day-to-day politics. Relations 
between the state and national minorities have been taken out of the ‘security’ box, and put in 
the ‘democratic politics’ box. Under these circumstances, the three factors I discussed earlier 
– demographics, rights-consciousness, multiple access points – to operate freely, and the 
almost inevitable result is the trend towards accommodation of diversity. 
It is worth noting that this desecuritization of ethnic politics in the West even applies to the 
issue of secession. Even though secessionist political parties wish to break up the state, 
citizens in the West assume that secessionists must be treated under the same democratic 
rules as everyone else, with the same democratic rights to mobilize, advocate and run for 
office. The reason for this remarkable tolerance of secessionist mobilization, I believe, is 
precisely the assumption that even if substate national groups do secede, they will become our 
allies, not our enemies (and also govern their seceding state in accordance with human rights 
and liberal-democratic values).  
 
IV. The Role of the International Community 
 
So far, I have focused on three obstacles to multination federalism in ECE: (a) scepticism 
about the likelihood that substate autonomies will be liberal-democratic; (b) the belief that 
ethnic mobilization, including substate nationalism, will disappear over time as a result of 
modernization and development; and (c) the fear that minorities will collaborate with enemies 
of the state. By contrast, in the West most citizens are (a) optimistic about the liberal-
democratic credentials of substate autonomies; (b) resigned to the long-term existence of 
ethnic politics and minority nationalist mobilization; and (c) confident that minorities will be 
allies not enemies in any larger regional or international security conflicts. 
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There are of course other obstacles to the exporting of Western models of multination 
federalism to the ECE, not least the unhappy experience of the failed Communist federations. 
But enough has been said, I think, to make clear the major challenges facing the international 
community in its efforts to promote minority rights in the region. 
It is clear that the West has the power to impose any number of conditions on ECE 
countries, including minority rights conditions. Most ECE countries are sufficiently desperate 
to get into the EU and NATO that they would accept virtually anything the West demanded in 
this area. But these legal and political reforms will only be successful and enduring if they are 
accompanied by changes in people’s underlying hopes, fears and expectations about state-
minority relations. And the crucial change here, I believe, involves the acceptance that 
nationalist mobilization by substate national groups is a normal and legitimate part of 
everyday politics in a free and democratic society. So long as this central idea continues to be 
resisted, there is little hope for genuine progress in state-minority relations. 
To my mind, this really involves two separate changes. First, it requires challenging the 
naive hope that minority nationalism will fade away with economic development and 
democratic consolidation. There is not a shred of evidence to support this hope, yet it remains 
remarkably widespread throughout the ECE, and so discourages people from recognizing the 
durability of the issue. Second, it requires challenging the ‘securitization’ of ethnic politics 
that arises from the fear that minorities will collaborate with neighbouring enemies. This is a 
more complicated issue, and probably can only be fully resolved by constructing viable 
regional structures of geo-political security, whether through the inclusion of ECE countries 
in NATO, or the construction of an alternate regional security body. But the successful 
negotiation and implementation of minority rights can only take place within democratic 
spaces that have been ‘desecuritized’. 
The central question, then, is whether the current activities of the international community 
are helping to ‘normalize’ and ‘desecuritize’ the democratic expression and mobilization of 
minority nationalism in Eastern Europe. In the volume, I attempt a provisional assessment of 
the activities of various Western organizations, including the OSCE, in this regard. My 
tentative answer, perhaps rather unsurprising, is that the record is mixed, and that much more 
could be done. While supporting the democratic rights of minorities in many respects, 
Western organizations are also, at times, feeding into myths and misperceptions about the 
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nature and durability of substate nationalisms. They have had some success at pushing 
various ECE countries to live up to certain very minimal standards regarding minority rights, 
but have not effectively challenged dominant ideologies about the illegitimate nature of 
substate nationalist claims for territorial autonomy and official language status, and have not 
pushed to create meaningful democratic spaces to deliberate about these claims in a free and 
informed way. 
However, my main aim is not to pass judgement on any particular international 
organization, but rather to stimulate greater reflection on the goals such organizations should 
be pursuing. As I said at the beginning of this paper, the original agenda behind the 
internationalizing of minority rights was driven by short-term concerns about avoiding 
violence and civil war. Today, we need to think more clearly about long-term goals. We need 
to think about the enduring conflicts that arise in multination states, about the institutions that 
can manage those conflicts in a peaceful manner, and about the underlying assumptions and 
beliefs that allow citizens to debate them in a free and democratic way. 
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